The War Politburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Poltical Road to the Tet Offensive

Why and how the North Vietnamese settled on the Tet Offensive perplexes historians to this day. U.S. policy setbacks in Vietnam and within the country provided the North Vietnamese an opportunity to undertake a major offensive aimed at a decisive victory to drive the United States out of the war, the current historiography goes. Developments inside North Vietnam and its political leadership become largely overlooked: ideological divisions and personal rivalries permeated Hanoi. Some wanted to develop a socialist state peacefully while others refused to let the chance pass to overrun the South with revolution, the former finding solace with the Soviets while the latter received encouragement from the Chinese.

1955-1959: War or Peace, Nation Building and Revolution in the Cold War:

After the French withdrew in 1954, the North Vietnamese undertook a disastrous set of socialist land reforms in the midst of reconstruction following the colonial war. The split between the Soviets and Chinese complicated North Vietnamese reconstruction, socialist development, and the path toward reunification. Given the failures of collectivization and industrialization projects, those calling for a war with the South gained greater clout. As the rift between the USSR and China deepened and resistance to the insurgency in the South intensified, the rifts inside the Politburo became more pronounced. The internal failures of revolution had not yielded absolute power to the South-firsters.

1960 - 1963: War or Bigger War?: Power Hierarchy in the DRV: Victorious "Apparatchiks":

The Communist Party rearranged itself in 1960 so that prowar leaders gained ascendancy and ensured that the government remain in control of the army. In response to the weakening of the Soviet detente posture in the international communist world and added American military presence in the South, the North Vietnamese began abandoning the "Self-Defense" clauses of previous decisions, and actively undertook military efforts in the South. Haphazard economic development in the North coupled with a military stalemate in the South and the necessity to remain on the goodside of both Russia and China presented the North Vietnamese with a quandry in the early 1960s.

The assassinations of Diem and J.F.K. in 1963 brought a new set of choices: negotiate in the South from advances made or go for an all out victory; the North Vietnamese settled for the latter as the state mobilized the entire country for an all-out war, revealing a tilt to the Chinese. The government proceeded to stamp out resistance at home and inside the government to the war effort.

1964-1977: Talking or Fighting?

The go for broke strategy brought a decrease in Soviet aid and a rise in American intervention without achieving anything fundamental militarily. Massing large amount of troops in unit offensives played into the American military superiority. Some began arguing for peace with the United States while others demanded a new military strategy. As the Soviets began sending more aid once America committed itself to the war, pro-Soviet moderates found a greater voice, especially as American bombings damaged development. Rather than negotiate, the hardliners believed a decisive attack launched in an election year could cripple the United States: any offensive would yield a stronger negotiating plank. Thus, the military leaders adopted a massive attack plan focusing on urban centers. A purge of arrests in the North that put many potential critics in jail or worse in 1967 was aimed to appease the Chinese as much as deter the Soviets.

The escalation of the American effort in South Vietnam in the mid 1960s made the war a focal point on the war stage and neither China nor the Soviet Union could be indifferent to it. The split between Russia and China hurt the North Vietnamese War Effort as their desire to appease both for supplies was not always fruitful. Seeking a big offesensive meant greater reliance on the Soviet Union for aid and perhaps a Soviet solution, which angered the Chinese.

Conclusion:

The Tet Offensive succeeded in shocking opinion in the United States, but not in South Vietnam.