Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars

L.B.J. had several options between 1963 and 1965 on escalation in the Vietnam War: domestic and international politics afforded him leeway. Political leaders in both parties doubted the wisdom of escalation, in strategic and political terms. No one in Europe, China, or the Soviet Union believed the United States would suffer a crippling blow to its prestige if it failed to defend South Vietnam. The South lacked the willpower and the resources to continue the war.

None of these facts escaped the White House policymakers, although they have belatedly attempted to mask their misgivings through pleading well-intended ignorance. Americanization cannot remotely be considered foreordained, despite the real domestic political costs for "losing" Vietnam. Losing the Great Society, credibility abroad, and a personal loss of face worried Johnson and the other top folks in his administration. On top of this were hopes that America could modernize Vietnam.